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Introduction 
Through out human history, there has been only about a handful of 
organizational forms that one can choose from to conduct business.  One can 
either conduct the business solely by oneself – the sole proprietorship, or 
conduct the business with someone else – partnerships.  These two forms were 
by far the most common forms available until the sixteenth century, when a third 
possibility arose – a company chartered by the government.  A company, in its 
historical primitive form, is an economic entity that usually involves a larger group 
of people as shareholders.  This organizational form also involves some forms of 
regulation established by the government.  In its mature form, it represents a 
legal institution in which investment is conducted through an organization, the 
company, with legal personality independent from the investors.  Investment is 
divided into transferable shares and usually investors’ liabilities are limited to the 
amount they have invested.  It is also a totally new idea of property, which on the 
one hand, the ownership is dispersed and, on the other hand, the property could 
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exist indefinitely until it is legally dissolved.  When companies become the 
majority of the economic actors, this domination represents the idea of turning 
widespread individual economic activities into a national economy, under the 
supervision of a state with centralized power.  Modern economy is therefore 
becoming a ‘depersonalized’ economic system.   
First developed in Europe, this form of business organization eventually 
diffused to other parts of the world until the mid-19th century, when companies of 
Western countries vigorously looked for markets worldwide.  Corporate forms 
were widely recognized as business organizational forms, created through a joint 
stock arrangement, that were used both to consolidate capital and to disperse 
the investment risk.  This modern organizational form was first used among high-
risk businesses such as trading, banking and insurance, but eventually became 
widely used in large-scale manufacturing enterprises when enormous amounts of 
capital were needed.   The idea of organizing the economy through companies, 
first spread out among European countries and America, was later on also 
adopted by most societies that had developed a modern industrialized economy.  
Human societies eventually experienced a globalization of the corporate 
economy. 
 
Corporate Forms as Social Institutions 
By seeing the company as a social institution, it has the following 
organizational characteristics:  (1) Institution is a set of relatively stable 
arrangements for repetitive practices.  (2) It needs rules and norms for 
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governance to create stability and order.  (3) These rules and norms, both formal 
and informal, constrain individuals’ action within the field or domain of the 
institution, but at the same time, facilitate individuals to re-enact the same actions 
as repertoire.  (4) These socially constructed rules and norms are 
phenomenological because they are most of the time taken for granted by those 
who participate in the institution (Zucker 1983).  This perspective suggests that 
our understanding of an institution, including economic institutions such as a 
company, should have a focus on a social process that is internal to the 
institution itself.  External conditions, such as economic competition, are relevant, 
but the reaction to these conditions is in turn shaped by the pre-existing norms 
and rules that were set up by the social process.  If corporate form is indeed a 
social institution, how should we understand the transformation of it?  How was 
corporate form as a way of doing business invented and transformed, and how 
was this Western idea dispersed to other parts of the world?  Did the company, 
as an economic institution, develop the same way in every country that adopted 
it?   
 
Historical Institutionalism and Institutional Transformation 
Historical institutionalism suggests that the institution is the product of 
concrete historical processes where timing and sequence of events are 
consequential (Thelen 1999; Mahoney 2000; Mahoney 2001a; Mahoney 2001b; 
Pierson 2000).  Institution transforms when critical events happen and redirect 
the course of development.  This redirection, while being constrained by past 
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trajectories, will eventually settle and ‘reproduce’ itself as the new path, until the 
next critical event(s) happen which will then make another change.  Once the 
initial conditions of the new path or development become self-reproducing or self-
reinforcing, this direction of development will have less chance to be re-directed 
to another trajectory.  It becomes path dependent.  Once a path has been set, 
there will be a ‘lock-in’ effect, that it will become very difficult to be re-directed to 
a different path.   
The usual way to explain path dependency is either the economic 
argument of increasing return (Arthur 1994) or the sociological argument of 
institutions as culturally shared scripts (Abbott 1997; Powell and DiMaggio 1991).  
These two versions of path dependency, however, will be inadequate to explain 
social change, since the path, according to these two explanations, once shaped, 
become difficult to change (Thelen 1999).  Historical institutionalism suggests 
that changes could occur during the occurrence of ‘critical junctures.’  Critical 
Junctures are events that could initiate a break through from the existing path 
and allow changes to a new path of development.  When significant events, or to 
the extreme, a crisis occurred, the path would become unstable and could be 
redirected to a different trajectory.  The contingent combination of conditions 
constitutes the ‘initial conditions’ for further development -- making a 
development that breaks away from the original path.  Critical junctures created 
an unstable situation which would cause a possibility of change.  Pre-existing 
conditions and other contingent factors of a certain setting are combined into a 
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particular ‘configuration’ which eventually constrain the choices of changes as 
the reaction to the particular critical juncture (Katznelson 1997). 
Evidently, the diffusion of corporate forms around the world as an idea of 
organization did not create an isomorphic result.  While the organizational form 
could be the same – with a board of directors, shareholders, managers, etc – 
apparently, the operational logic of the corporations was always socially and 
culturally defined.  Historical institutionalism would suggest that even 
experiencing the same critical event that would lead to the adoption of corporate 
forms, the outcome could be different because of the particular configuration and 
the interactive outcome under each setting.  Accordingly, given similar economic 
motives, the different institutional configurations in different societies could have 
generated different forms of corporate governance that are distinguished from 
each other (Fligstein and Freeland 1995; Guthrie 1999). 
 
The China Case 
Since the mid-19th century, the presence of foreign economic powers in 
China changed Chinese economic life permanently.  Competition created by the 
foreign power pushed both the Chinese state and the business community to 
respond.  Western ideas on how the economy should be run, along with many 
other Western ideas, were introduced into China and have been imitated since 
then.  In 1872, the China Merchants’ Stream Navigation Company, the first 
Chinese owned company that was modeled on Western corporate forms, was 
established in China.  New business organizational concepts such as board of 
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directors, shareholders, general meetings, limited liability, and so forth, were 
introduced into China and gradually changed the contours of commercial life in 
China. 
My goal in this study is to reveal that the Chinese merchants did not 
simply adopt the corporate forms and use them to engage in the modern 
economy, and they were not simply being guided by the Western tradition-based 
Company Law.  Rather, Chinese merchants, and later entrepreneurs, were using 
the joint-stock company as a way to bundle pre-existing social relations, 
traditional Chinese business practices, and nationalistic ideologies into a more 
useful organizational format that allowed for the accumulation of capital.  The 
analysis offers a way to understand how continuity in Chinese social organization 
was maintained in the face of economic transformation, and shows how pre-
existing social relationships were embedded in the adaptation of modern 
business rationality. 
Pressures for increasing economic competitiveness of the Chinese 
business community in lieu of the economic invasion of foreign capital was the 
‘critical juncture’ that forced the Chinese society to formulate a solution to solve 
the ‘crisis.’  The social consensus at that time was a demand for a change of the 
organizational structure of the economy, even though general comments on this 
transformation – the adoption of Western corporate forms – are that it was not as 
successful as it should have been. 
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The Argument 
While I do not intend to neglect political and economic factors, I argue 
that, besides these factors, there were more important social dimensions 
determining the transformation.  The critical juncture that initiated the 
transformation of the Chinese economic institution was the strong presence of 
foreign capital in the mid-19th century.  This external factor became the significant 
cause of the eventual break down of the traditional mode of economic 
organization, and the replacement of it with the modern, Western, mode of 
organization.  The path that took off from this juncture and developed into a 
‘legacy’ (Collier and Collier 1991) was constrained and shaped by the particular 
historical configuration in China during that time (Katznelson 1997).  At least 
three factors contributed to these organizational changes in pre-1949 China: (1) 
The pre-existing institutional configuration of Chinese business, (2) state - 
business community interaction, and (3) the social construction of an ideology of 
commercial competition and what was a company.  While analytically distinctive, 
these three factors interacted with each other and created the contextual base in 
20th century China for the emergence of Western style corporations, and 
eventually created a new “social system of production” (Hollingsworth and Boyer 
1997).   
 
Pre-existing Institutional settings 
From an institutionalist perspective, the process by which the corporate 
forms emerged is embedded in preexisting institutional configurations.  While the 
‘form’ could be copied from the West, the actual operation of the corporations 
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would be different if economic activities in China were embedded in an 
institutional history different from the West.  Faure (1994) insightfully suggested 
that what we will find out is that tradition-bound attitudes were not replaced by 
the idea of share holding – the most essential feature of a modern company.  
Rather, it was share holding that was being absorbed into the Chinese business 
tradition.  A blending of old and new elements did occur during the period of 
transformation. 
Differences in institutional settings between China and other societies are 
obvious.  Economic transformation in Europe, for example, was historically based 
on a very distinctive institutional ‘path’ that China did not pass through (Collins 
1980; Duplessis 1997; Hunt and Murray 1999).  Without a similar institutional 
base, companies in Chinese would have been developed from a different 
trajectory.  Many studies on the traditional Chinese business world suggest that a 
different set of criteria on ‘ways of doing things’ had been institutionalized 
(Biggart and Hamilton 1997).  One prominent organizational feature of the 
traditional Chinese business world is its network forms of organization.  While 
network forms of economic organization can be found in different times and 
spaces (Cookson 1997; Håkansson and Johanson 1993; Saxenian 1994; Uzzi 
1996; Uzzi 1997), it is evident that networks are far more easily developed and 
more effective in a stable and predictable manner in Chinese societies, where 
personal trust and norms of reciprocity are highly institutionalized.  It served as 
one of the most important organizational principles of the traditional Chinese 
economy (Jones 1974; Rowe 1984; Lai 1994). 
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State-Business Interaction 
The path of economic development in China is very much a development 
without much state intervention.  The Imperial state controlled a few monopoly 
businesses (e.g. salt), but left daily commerce out of her hands most of the time.  
Therefore, the original economic institutions in China reproduced themselves 
with little interference from the state.  The presence of foreign economic power 
that was backed up by their states became an external factor that distorted the 
original path of Chinese economic development.  The institution that reproduced 
the ‘stateless’ economy (Hamilton 1996) now had to transform itself into a 
different institution that required extensive participation of the government. 
While organizing one’s business in modern corporate forms seems to be a 
personal choice, the extent to which the state is involved is at the same time very 
crucial, especially when we observe these personal choices would eventually 
transform the institutional structure on a national level.  An efficient state is 
required for implementation if we see the corporation as an entity that could 
acquire its legal status only by registering with the state according to the 
company law.  The state, therefore, is the crucial institutional actor that is directly 
related to the formation of corporate forms. 
Compared with Japan’s modernization experience, the positive role of the 
state in China was minimal in terms of economic policy making (Chu 1994; 
Westney 1987; Yan 1999).  This however doesn’t mean that the Chinese 
government, be it the Qing Dynasty or the Republican government, played no 
role in defining the social relations in and among corporations.  The state still had 
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the legitimate power to use company law and other institutional tools to define 
how firms should organize.  On the other hand, the business community was not 
a passive receiver of state intervention.  The community had continuously 
interpreted and redefined those “external constraints.”   
 
Social Construction of Commercial Competition 
The presence of foreign capital had a significant impact on the 
development of corporate forms in China in at least two dimensions.  First, to a 
certain extent, the presence of foreign companies ‘framed’ the way the Chinese 
understood corporations.  Since the late 19th century, there was a shared belief 
that in order to strengthen China, commerce in China had to be developed and 
modernized, and in order to develop commerce, the economy should be 
organized along the lines of the Western style corporation (Guo 1995; Zhu 1996).  
In the eyes of the Chinese, it was the organizational format of the Westerners 
that created the competitive edge.  The limited liability company became 
accepted as the only ‘legitimate’ form of organization chiefly among ‘modern’ 
businesses such as textile and spinning, railways, mining, banking, and so forth.  
Foreign companies in China during that time were used as a model for how a 
company should be operated.  However, while the Chinese were imitating the 
organization of Western companies, their ideological understanding of the whole 
learning process was shaped by Western domination.  The fact that imitation 
occurred as part of a commercial ‘war’ significantly narrowed their perception of 
the organizational features of a corporation.   
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These three dimensions became the configurative setting of China during 
the period of institutional transformation.  The eventual legacy of the 
transformation in China, as shaped by the particular configuration, was inevitably 
different from those societies with different historical configurations.  One crucial 
difference between China and Japan, for example, is the timing of the political 
reform in the two countries.  Japan had the Meiji Restoration in 1862 and had 
built a more efficient Western-modeled government since then.  Besides a few 
attempts to reform the government, the Imperial Qing in China never transformed 
herself into a modern state.  The 1911-12 revolution had overthrown the Qing 
dynasty but then had led China into decades of chaos, followed by continuous 
warfare until 1949.  The Chinese state never had a chance to perform the same 
roles as the Japanese state had in the country’s development.  Also, the modern 
banking system, which was very important for the development of the economy, 
was set up in 1872 in Japan but the same institution did not develop in China 
until 1898 and never functioned well.  All these differences in the “sequence of 
events” created a distinctive historical configuration for China at the turn of the 
last century. 
 
Western Corporate Forms and the Chinese Economy 
At least up to the end of the nineteenth century, the majority of Chinese 
businesses were mediated by personal networks backed up by personal trust.  
The particular patterns of social relations and the social logic behind them 
become the social foundation of the network economy in China.  The use of 
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social logic, therefore, provides an institutional foundation for economic 
transactions in the Chinese business setting.  Characterized by a flexible, 
cooperative and long-term social orientation, the social logic of the Chinese – the 
guanxi logic – is embedded in the daily business practices of the Chinese 
business community, past and present.   
This stable institutional setting was soon challenged by the arrival of 
foreign companies since the late 19th century who traded, and later 
manufactured, goods in China.  The business settings had since then been 
changed and required new adjustments for the Chinese business community to 
survive.  It was during a time when the Chinese government was involved very 
little in regulating the economy, and had left this responsibility to ‘private’ 
organizations such as huiguan and gongsuo.   
At that time, China had already developed some advanced business 
institutions and practices well before her contact with the Western institutions.  
The traditional mode of business practices was effective enough in the face of 
increasing commercialization of modern China, until they met foreign capital with 
a rather different way of organizing. It is obvious that the traditional modes of 
organization used by Chinese merchants could not create the kind of wealth 
Western capitalists were creating at that time. This moment became the ‘critical 
juncture’ for the Chinese economy to be redirected to a different path of 
development.  The Chinese considered copying the Western way of business 
organization, with the hope that the economy could be as strong as the West. 
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Compared with the China case of imitation, the British ‘invented’ most of 
the ideas of this new form of business organization – the corporate form.  This 
invention, however, did not come out from any necessary conditions, but by and 
large, was a rather contingent outcome of a series of historical conditions – a 
continuous and high speed growth of the economy, which in turn created a 
general public with surplus wealth looking for investment opportunities.  This high 
level of wealth among the general public also, unexpectedly, reinforced the 
growth of private firms, and contributed to the later under-development of larger 
public firms.  The very long tradition of litigation in Britain also helped to develop 
an economy that functioned through interactions between firms in an impersonal 
manner.   
The Japan case, on the other hand, represents a case of imitation.  The 
imitating process, and the outcome of it, however, turned out to be different from 
the China case – which was also a case of imitation.  The same process in two 
different societies, resulted in two different outcomes, largely because of their 
differences in their institutional settings.  The existence of an effective state 
apparatus seemed to be crucial, playing a key role in the institutionalization of the 
corporate forms in Japan.  This new form of organization, while being copied in a 
pretty accurate way, eventually became a vehicle to facilitate the further 
development of the traditional patterns of business organization.  Corporate 
forms, in Japan, were used more as a new tool for control than as a tool to 
consolidate capital.   
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The China case represents yet another scenario.  With the Imperial state, 
and later, the Republican state, being unable to regulate the economy effectively, 
the institutional transformation of the Chinese economy was, most of the time, in 
a self-regulating status.  Without an applicable Company Law and the related 
institutional support long after the introduction of corporate forms to China, this 
new institution was forced to adapt to the pre-existing traditional institutional 
setting when it attempted to gain legitimacy from the business community.  I 
argue that the traditional practices were allowed to co-exist with the modern 
business practices for a long time.  This co-existence provided an opportunity not 
just for the survival of old practices, but also for interpenetration of influence 
between each other.  Domination of the nationalistic viewpoint on what a 
company could do also created a side effect by not encouraging the 
understanding of what is a company from a less ideological and more 
economical point of view.   
While considered as an efficient way to accumulate capital in other parts 
of the world, ironically, China’s social-economic context, with the scarcity of 
capital, did not have enough wealth to push forward a ‘stranger’ economy.  Idle 
capital didn’t really exist, or there were better places for it to go.  The institutional 
foundation for impersonal investment in China, therefore, was never developed.  
Impersonal investment practice was simply not something that needed to be 
developed. Businesses that needed a large size of capital at the end had to 
depend on traditional mechanisms to generate the needed capital.  Many 
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traditional business practices eventually continued to be used simply because 
they had never been replaced.   
 
The hybrid of Old and New 
 The idea of ‘joint-stock’ was not totally new to the Chinese.  The only new 
component was the size of this ‘joint-stock’ venture.  Some of the features of a 
modern Western company, such as shares of equal value, profits divided 
according to the number of shares one’s owned, separation of management and 
ownership, already had wide understanding amount the Chinese traditional 
business community.  What the Chinese were not familiar with, and arguable the 
more important features of corporate form, were features such as the juristic 
personality of the company, limited liability and the regulatory role of the state 
through company law and other legislation.  Even more significant, there was a 
lack of institutional foundation for impersonal exchange in the traditional Chinese 
business practices, which were essential for the advancement to a modern 
economy. 
For the Chinese business community, the corporate form was supposed to 
be a better form of business organization, but the greatest advantage that could 
be experienced in China was the ability of the company to accumulate a larger 
amount of capital.  Other advantages, for example, the legal protection, were 
either not of their concern or did not exist because of the inefficient state.  The 
legitimacy of corporate forms, as understood by the business community, was 
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that this form of business organization, as different from all the traditional forms 
in China, had the ability to ‘house’ a very large amount of capital.   
The progress of replacing the traditional business organization – sole 
propriety and partnerships - did not just interfere by disregarding the legal 
elements and therefore the company law, the process was also impaired by the 
lack of a supportive institutional matrix that was crucial to the development of a 
corporate economy.  In the Western legal development, company law was only 
part of a larger legal matrix that was used to facilitate economic activities.  
Besides the company law that defines the organization and operation of 
corporate forms, stock market, banking and insurance, Western double entry 
accounting, and other legal elements like the bankruptcy law were also crucial 
components of this supportive institutional matrix.  All these, however, were 
either underdeveloped or missing during the transformation of the Chinese 
economy.  Without a full range of development of a larger institutional matrix, 
traditional business practices were reinvented under the new rules of the modern 
business organization.  The new ‘Western’ institution was just being put on the 
top of the existing institutions.  The foundation was the same even though the 
external structure of the organization had changed.   
There could be a few reasons why the Western corporate forms didn’t 
replace the old system.  When the idea of Western corporation was introduced to 
China, it was confronted with an existing system that was mature and well 
functioning.  Obviously, it could not help the Chinese to industrialize the 
economy, but other than that, it was a functional system.  When the system had 
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been around for such a long time and was well established, it became difficult to 
totally replace an old system.  Any change, if any, would be path dependent.  At 
the same time, the establishment of the Western system in China eventually took 
more than a few decades, so there was a long period of time that the old system 
and the new system co-existed, and in many ways, the old system seemed to be 
working fairly well with the new system, sometimes even complementary with 
each other.  A good example was the relationships between the Western firms 
and banks and the Chinese native banks.  They were depending on each other 
for their business for more than a few decades.   
Historical institutionalism suggests society could change when the original 
path was being disturbed, either by external or internal factors.  This change, 
while contingent on its occurrence, will be subjected to the influence of the 
configuration of variables that are pre-existing.  The path of development will be 
shaped by those initial conditions when the change happened.  In the case of 
China, this pre-existing action framework would be used as the medium for 
diffusion of new ideas.  New ideas were interpreted and digested with the help of 
old ideas.  When tradition has a chance to be re-invented, the happening of 
social change would therefore be more unlikely to converge in the same 
direction, than to diverge on different paths.  The diffusion of institutions, even 
with surface similarities, the meanings and operational logic behind it could 
remain informed by distinct local understanding in each society (Ruskola 2000).   
Societies could have different paths of development.  Each development is 
path dependent, with the result that each development carries its own 
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characteristics.  Corporate governance, for example, differs among various social 
contexts.  There is a Chinese way, but also a German way, a Japanese way, and 
an American way.  These different ways of doing things, however, should be 
understood more as outcomes of contingent configurations of historical events 
and factors each society has experienced, rather than as essentially 
unchangeable elements of these cultures.  The Chinese, with the right 
combination of factors, could have developed business corporate forms that are 
comparable with the West.  On the same token, should the legal system be more 
accessible and effective, the Chinese would be less dependent on personal ties 
to solve problems and less litigious than their Western counterparts.  Distinction 
between dichotomies such as East and West, traditional and modern, therefore, 
may not be as useful as we thought. 
The diffusion of ideas would be more successful if the new ideas can 
serve local needs better than the pre-existing ones.  It is not necessarily that the 
idea is going to serve the same need in every place; rather, the same idea could 
be used for different purposes within different contexts, and it will survive and 
develop so long as it is useful to the new environment.  The part that is useful to 
the context will be adopted and integrated into the pre-existing framework.  
Those that are not useful and are in contradiction with the existing system will 
either be discarded or modified.  Transformation is, therefore, always a matter of 
degree, and there are many possible forms in between.  
My research shows the process through which the Western-modeled 
business organization – the limited liability company – was transplanted into 
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China.  I argue that Chinese companies, like companies in other societies, were 
created, as a way to meet external constraints, by the social interaction of 
different actors within a particular pre-existing institutional field.  When the 
institutional field, the actors involved and the external constraints are different, 
the outcome is different.  Political and economic factors matter, but they only 
represent external factors.  How people organize to respond to external 
constraints cannot simply be reduced to the nature of the constraints.  The 
particular process on how the society formulates reactions to those external 
factors is far more crucial in explaining the institutional outcomes.  People do not 
just respond passively to external constraints.  Their responses are a result of 
‘subjective’ interpretations of the constraints and are limited by the institutional 
constraints that already exist. 
This analysis is not to suggest a distinct difference between the West and 
the rest, or China and the rest.  All cultures and societies share something in 
common one way or another.  In terms of initial factors, there were many 
similarities between Western Europe and China (Pomeranz 1997), the 
differences, however, were in the combination of those factors, plus the few 
differences, that eventually created two different configurations.  China, for 
example, did not have the same geopolitical competition as in Europe which 
could push more vigorous reform.  Competition between the French and the 
British governments, for example, did not just stimulate innovations, which 
eventually led to changes, but also encouraged inventions on institutional 
arrangement to diffuse between them (Freedman 1979).  Also, in terms of timing, 
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the external issues that China was facing in the late nineteenth century were 
already very different from those that were faced by Western Europe, and in 
particular England, a century ago. 
While it is always possible to compare two regions or cultures on a certain 
factor (or even a few factors), an overall comparison of all the factors is simply 
not fruitful since the differences in historical outcomes between China and 
England, for example, are not about what factor China or England had or had 
not.  More significantly, it is about the overall configuration of all the conditions, 
which is more important in creating different consequences.  The existence of 
traditional or pseudo-traditional institutions along with the emergence of new 
“modern” institutions in China during the transitional period was not a unique 
experience.  England, during her early industrialization period, had also gone 
through a similar situation.  The lack of certain conditions, combined with a 
difference in sequence and timing of events, however, resulted in different 
historical configurations in the two countries. 
 21
References 
 
Abbott, Andrew. “On the Concept of Turning Point.” Comparative Social 
Research 16: 85-106. 1997.  
Arthur, W. Brian. 1994. Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the 
Economy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Biggart, Nicole Woolsey and Gary G. Hamilton. 1997. “On the Limits of a Firm-
Based Theory to Explain Business Networks:  The Western Bias of 
Neoclassical Economics.” In The Economic Organization of East Asian 
Capitalism. Edited by Marco Orrù, Nicole Woolsey Biggart, and Gary G. 
Hamilton. London: Sage. 
Chu, Yingui. 1994. Guojia Ganyu Jingji yu Zhongri Jindaihua (Government 
Intervention in Economy and the Modernization of China and Japan). 
Beijing: Dongfang Chubanshe. 
Collier, Ruth B. and David Collier. 1991. Shaping the Political Arena: Critical 
Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Collins, Randall. 1980. “Weber's Last Theory of Capitalism: A Systematization.” 
American Sociological Review 45: 925-942. 
Cookson, Gillian. 1997. “Family Firms and Business Networks: Textile 
Engineering in Yorkshire, 1780-1830.” Business History 39 (1): 1-20. 
Duplessis, Robert S. 1997. Transitions to Capitalism in Early Modern Europe. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Fligstein, Neil and Robert Freeland. 1995. “Theoretical and Comparative 
Perspectives on Corporate Organization.” Annual Review of Sociology 21: 
21-43. 
Formoy, Ronald Ralph. 1923. The Historical Foundation of Modern Company 
Law.Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd. 
Freedman, Charles E. 1979. Joint-Stock Enterprise in France 1807-1867. From 
Privileged Company to Modern Corporation. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press. 
Guo, X. 1995. Zhongguo Jindai Zhenxing Jingji zhi Dao de Bijiao (A Comparison 
on the Ideas of Promoting Economy in Modern China). Shanghai: 
Shanghai Caijing Daxue Chubanshe. 
Guthrie, Doug. 1999. Dragon in a Three-piece Suit. The Emergence of 
Capitalism in China. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 22
Hamilton, Gary G. 1996. “Overseas Chinese Capitalism.” In  Confucian 
Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and Economic 
Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-dragons. Edited by W. M. Tu. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Håkansson, Håkan and Jan Johanson. 1993. “The Network as a Governance 
Structure: Interfirm Cooperation Beyond Markets and Hierarchies.” In The 
Embedded Firm.  On the Socioeconomics of Industrial Networks. Edited 
by Gernot Grabher. London: Routledge. 
Hollingsworth, J. Rogers and Robert Boyer. 1997. “Coordination of Economic 
Actors and Social Systems of Production.” In Contemporary Capitalism.  
The Embeddedness of Institutions. Edited by J. Rogers Hollingsworth and 
Robert Boyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hunt, Edwin S. and James M. Murray. 1999. A History of Business in Medieval 
Europe. 1200-1550. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ireland, P. W. 1984. “The Rise of the Limited Liability Company.” International 
Journal of Sociology of Law 12: 239-260. 
Jones, Susan Mann. 1974. “The Ningpo Pang and Financial Power at Shanghai.” 
In The Chinese City Between Two Worlds. Edited by Mark Elvin and G. 
William Skinner. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Katznelson, I. 1997. “Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics.” In 
Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure. Edited by M. I. 
Lichbach and A. S. Zuckerman. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Kirby, William C. 1995. “China Unincorporated: Company Law and Business 
Enterprise in Twentieth-Century China.” Journal of Asian Studies 54: 43-
63. 
Lai, Chi-kong. 1994. “Cantonese Business Networks in Late Nineteenth Century 
Shanghai: The Case Kwang-Chao Kung-So.” In Essays in Economic and 
Business History. Edited by Edwin J. Perkins. Los Angeles. 
Mahoney, James. 2000. “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology.” Theory and 
Society 29, 507-548.  
Mahoney, James. 2001a. “Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: 
Central America in Comparative Perspective.” Studies in Comparative 
International Development 36(1), 111-141.  
Mahoney, James. 2001b. The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and 
Political Regimes in Central America. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
 23
Pierson, Paul. 2000. “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of 
Politics.” American Politican Science Review 94(2), 251.  
Pomeranz, Kenneth. 1997. “Traditional" Chinese Business Forms Revisited: 
Family, Firm, and Financing in the History of the Yutang Company of 
Jining, 1779-1956.” Late Imperial China 18 (1): 1-38. 
Powell, Walter W. and Paul J. DiMaggio (eds.) 1991. The New Institutionalism in 
Organization Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Rowe, William T. 1984. Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 
1796-1889. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Roy, William G. 1996. Socializing Capital.  The Rise of the Large Industrial 
Corporation in America. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Ruskola, Teemu. 2000. “Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative 
Law and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective.” Stanford Law 
Review 52: 1599-1729. 
Saxenian, Anna Lee. 1994. Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Rt. 
128 and Silicon Valley. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Steinmo, Sven, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth (eds.) 1992.  Structuring 
Politics. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics.” 
Annual Review of Political Science 2, 369-404.  
Uzzi, Brian. 1996. “The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the 
Economic Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect.” American 
Sociological Review 61 (4): 674-698. 
Uzzi, Brian. 1997. “Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The 
Paradox of Embeddedness.” Administrative Science Quarterly 42 (1): 35-
67. 
Westney, D. Eleanor. 1987. Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Western 
Organizational Patterns to Meiji Japan. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Yan, Lixian. 1999. Zhongguo yu Riban de Zaoqi Gongyehua yu Guonei Shichang 
(Proto-industrialization and Domestic Market of China and Japan). Beijing: 
Beijing University Press. 
 24
Zhu, Ying. 1996. Wanqing Jingji Zhece yu Gaige Cuoshi (The Late Qing 
Economic Policies and Reform Measure). Wuchang: Huazhong Shifan 
Daxue Chubanshe. 
Zucker, L. 1983. Organizations as Institutions. In Research in the Sociology of 
Organizations. Edited by Samuel B. Bacharach. Greenwich, CT: JAI 
Press. 
